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Abstract
Satellites are the most efficient way to achieve global scale quantum
communication (Q.Com) because unavoidable losses restrict fiber based Q.Com
to a few hundred kilometers. We demonstrate the feasibility of establishing a
Q.Com uplink with a tiny 3U CubeSat (measuring just 10×10×32 cm3) using
commercial off-the-shelf components, the majority of which have space heritage.
We demonstrate how to leverage the latest advancements in nano-satellite
body-pointing to show that our 4 kg CubeSat can provide performance
comparable to much larger 600 kg satellite missions. A comprehensive link budget
and simulation was performed to calculate the secure key rates. We discuss
design choices and trade-offs to maximize the key rate while minimizing the cost
and development needed. Our detailed design and feasibility study can be readily
used as a template for global scale Q.Com.
Keywords: Quantum communication; CubeSat; QKD; Feasibility Study; Satellite
technology; Quantum Optics
1 Introduction
The security of quantum communication (Q.Com) is based on fundamental and
immutable laws of physics and not on the hope that a problem is too difficult for
an adversary to solve. Naturally, this future-proof and unconditionally secure com-
munication technology has a large impact on global communications. Attempts to
overcome the limits imposed by losses, such as Ref. [1], and attempts to create a
global satellite based network are underway [2, 3]. The latter are gigantic and incred-
ibly complex ultra-modern satellites which can cost upwards of 100 millione each.
Small CubeSats however can be constructed and launched for 1 to 10 millione. We
used an iterative Size, Weight and Power (SWaP) optimization process to create a
design for the simplest, smallest, lightest and least power-consuming satellite sys-
tem capable of Q.Com with a commercially viable key rate. We studied previous
long distance implementations via optical fiber [4], free space terrestrial links [5]
and the successful 600 kg class [2] and 50 kg class [6] large satellites. By analyzing
the results of these proof-of-concept missions and evaluating their performance in
both the uplink and the downlink scenario, we find that benefits due to the frac-
tionally larger key rate during downlink are completely outweighed by the lower
cost, ease of operation ahd simplicity offered by an uplink to the satellite. Addi-
tionally, an uplink allows for a larger variety of implementable Q.Com protocols
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(i.e., future-proof nature). This is because many different Q.Com protocols (e.g.,
E91 [7], BB84 [8], decoy state protocol (DSP) [9], BBM [10], B92 [11]) rely on nearly
identical detection schemes for the receiver and can thus all be implemented on our
CubeSat. Previous studies such as Ref. [12, 13, 14] have shown that space-based
Q.Com is in principle feasible and culminated in two successful Q.Com satellites.
Recent efforts have evaluated the feasibility of downlinks [15] while others have at-
tempted to solve the technological challenges identified by space certifying detectors
and sources of entanglement [16]. However, no previous works have evaluated the
feasibility of Q.Com uplinks to satellites as small as a 3U CubeSat.
The CubeSat design considered here, will also measure light pollution stemming
from the ground with a narrow field of view and thus establish a global map. This
is crucial to finding dark areas near potential Q.Com customers and for other, more
general applications. The timing resolution of the single photon detectors enables
pulse-position-modulation in classical communication from ground to space, with
exceptionally fast data rates. The extremely sensitive single photon detectors can
also be re-purposed for other terrestrial and astronomical observations with an
exceptional cadence and narrow FOV. In this manuscript we nevertheless focus on
Q.Com, since this objective drives the design for the satellite infrastructure.
1.1 Quantum communication protocols
Let us consider the two most common Q.Com protocols – E91 [7] and the decoy state
protocol (DSP) [9] which are explained in detail in Ref. [17, 18]. In both, information
is encoded in the polarization state of single photons at the ground station (Alice)
who then sends these states to the satellite (Bob). Bob measures the polarization
of the received photons in a set of randomly chosen bases. The protocol is divided
into several individual “trials”. In each trial, one state is sent and received. The
techniques used to identify each trial depend on experimental implementation and
protocol. To ensure that the key is secure, Alice and Bob perform statistical tests
(i.e., compute the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER E) [19] and/or perform a Bell
test) on the data they measured from several trials. Thus, they also need a form of
(insecure but authenticated) classical communication. To obtain the key, Alice and
Bob need various post-processing (PP) steps (detailed in [20]) that vary between
protocols [1]. Importantly, the larger the measured QBER, the more information an
eavesdropper (Eve) could, in principle, obtain about the key. Thus the number of
secure bits of key that can be exchanged per second depends on the QBER. The
key difference between the protocols is that E91 exploits quantum entanglement of
photons to obtain mutually shared randomness (the key) between the two parties.
In DSP however, Alice encodes information by randomly choosing the polarization
of an emitted weak coherent pulse. Alice must also randomly choose the average
intensity of each pulse (to designate it as a signal or decoy pulse) in order to avoid
a photon number splitting attack. Thus each protocol needs a different source on
ground as seen in Fig. 1 (such as Ref. [21] for E91 and Ref. [22] for DSP).
2 Error budget
The security proofs for both E91 and DSP show that a secure key can be exchanged
only if the QBER E is below a certain value. For E91, the overall limit EmaxE91 is
[1]The PP steps also require a classical communication channel
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Figure 1 The optical ground station (OGS) is connected either to one arm of a source of
polarization entangled photon pairs (E91) or to a pulsed laser with randomly chosen polarization
and mean photon number for each pulse (DSP). The signal photons are transmitted to the
CubeSat in a 500 km low-earth orbit (LEO) via a free-space link. OGS and CubeSat point beacon
lasers at each other for precise attitude control. The quantum signal is analyzed on board the
CubeSat using a randomly switched half-wave plate (HWP) and a polarizing beam splitter (PBS).
Measurement outcome, basis choice and time tag of each event are recorded. Information about
the latter two is transmitted to the OGS using a classical radio frequency (RF) link. The OGS
identifies the matching bits using a cross-correlation analysis (g(2)) and tells the CubeSat which
ones to use. Both disregard the other bits, perform post-processing and then share a sifted key.
11.0 % [23], assuming optimal classical PP with error correction efficiency f = 1.
Realistic PP techniques limit EmaxE91 to 10.2%, assuming a PP efficiency of f =
1.1 [24]. For DSP with the same f and assuming the values from Table 1, the limit
EmaxDSP is about 6.2%
[2]. These security requirements can be reformulated in terms
of the more familiar Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) as
SNR =
1
E
− 1 . (1)
For unconditional security, any and all noise must be attributed to Eve. This re-
quires a minimum SNR for E91 (DSP) to 8.8 (15.1) for realistic PP with f = 1.1.
Nevertheless, we shall continue using E (instead of the SNR) to be compatible with
existing literature. Based on the formulas devised in Ref. [25], the QBER for the
E91 protocol can be written as
EE91 =e0 − 1
QE91
[
(2)
(e0 − ed)ΛAΛBµE91(1 + µE912 )
(1 + ΛA
µE91
2 )(1 + ΛB
µE91
2 )(1 + ΛA
µE91
2 + ΛB
µE91
2 − ΛAΛB µE912 )
]
,
[2]Because the information entropy factor (in square brackets) depends on the gains
for DSP (see Eq. 9), there is no constant limit for DSP, it depends on losses and
average photon number per pulse. The value given is a mean value for the loss
scenarios considered by us.
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where
QE91 = 1− 1− Y0B
(1 + ΛB
µE91
2 )
2
+
1− Y0B
(1 + ΛA
µE91
2 + ΛB
µE91
2 − ΛAΛB µE912 )2
, (3)
is the gain (or the probability of coincident photon detection per trial), ΛA (ΛB)
is the total loss in the channel to Alice on ground (to Bob on the satellite), e0
denotes the probability of a dark count to yield an error and ed is the probability
of a photon being detected in the wrong detector. The average photon number per
trial is µE91 = R
P
E91τ (where R
P
E91 is the E91 source’s pair production rate and
τ is the coincidence time window). The dark count yield (or probability that a
dark count occurs per trial) at the satellite is defined as Y0B = RB+D · τ (where
RB+D is the total rate of noise counts on the CubeSat). The effect of even several
thousand noise counts on the ground based detectors is negligibly small compared
to expected single count rates of ≈ 107 cps, thus we neglect the probability of a
noise count occurring at Alice (Y0A ≈ 0). The secure key rate (i.e., bits per second)
RSE91
[3] follows directly from these quantities:
RSE91 ≥
1
2
QE91
τ
[
1− (1 + f)H2(EE91)
]
, (4)
where the factor 12 is due to the fact that only half of all basis choices are compatible,
H2(x) is the binary Shannon entropy
H2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x) , (5)
and EE91 is the QBER averaged over one measurement run where start and stop
of the measurement have been chosen such that the temporal integral of RSE91 over
one connection is maximized. These quantities can analogously be defined for DSP,
this time following Ref. [9]. The total QBER EDSP is given by
EDSP =
ed (1− e−µDSP ·ΛB ) + e0Y0B
QDSP
, (6)
with the total gain QDSP given by
QDSP = 1− e−µDSP ·ΛB + Y0B . (7)
We choose the mean photon number per trial (or signal pulse) µDSP=0.64 in or-
der to maximize the secure key rate RSDSP . Unlike µE91, the mean photon number
per pulse in DSP µDSP can in practice be chosen arbitrarily, since the pulses orig-
inate directly from a (strongly attenuated) pulsed laser and not from inefficient
spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) taking place in a nonlinear crys-
tal. However, since for DSP only the true single-photon pulses can be assumed to
[3]In information theory, “rate” is a normalized quantity related to entropy. However,
throughout this paper we continue to use the common definition of rate as number
of occurrences/instances per second.
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contain secure bits, their individual QBER E1DSP and gain Q
1
DSP also have to be
defined:
E1DSP =
edΛB + e0Y0B
ΛB + Y0B
Q1DSP = (ΛB + Y0B)µDSPe
−µDSP . (8)
The secure key rate can now be calculated as
RSDSP ≥
1
4
Rrep µDSP
[
Q1DSP
(
1−H2(E1DSP )
)− f QDSPH2(EDSP )] , (9)
where the factor 14 is due to the fact that only half of the photons are measured in
the right basis and another half are non-usable decoy states. Rrep is the repetition
rate of the DSP source. Analogous to Eq. 4, E1DSP and EDSP denote the QBERs
averaged over one measurement run. Using the realistic values shown in Table 1,
we can calculate the amount of loss each protocol can tolerate. The total link loss
to the satellite, ΛB , for E91 (DSP) must be better than -62.7 dB (-61.2 dB) in order
to obtain a secure key, i.e. achieve a SNR of more than 8.8 (15.1). Accounting for
losses in the apparatus of Alice and Bob, the maximum tolerable link loss ΛL from
sending lens to receiving lens alone, is -43.6 dB (-42.2 dB) for E91 (DSP).
3 Preliminary design
The advantage of the uplink scenario is that most of the mission’s complexity
is ground based and multiple protocols/experiments can be implemented. Conse-
quently, to better understand the CubeSat design, we must first discuss the design of
the optical ground station (OGS, Sec. 3.1) and then that of the CubeSat (Sec. 3.2).
Fig. 1 shows an overview of the experiment consisting of space and ground segments.
Table 1 provides reasonable reference values for the specifications and performance
of all components as used below. Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of all payload com-
ponents necessary for the Q.Com mission.
3.1 The ground segment
Our CubeSat mission is capable of implementing a wide variety of Q.Com protocols,
each of which require different sources within the OGS. E.g. the E91 protocol re-
quires an entangled photon source with a pair production rate RPE91=100 Mcps [26]
and an intrinsic heralding efficiency ΛH of 85% (−0.7 dB) [27]. For Alice to detect
these extreme count rates on ground, we suggest using multiplexed arrays of super-
conducting nanowire single photon detectors (SNSPDs) with a detection efficiency
ηA of 70% (85% for one single SNSPD without multiplexing) and a total timing jit-
ter (including electronics) tA of 16ps (15 ps for the SNSPD alone) [28]. This results
in a total ΛA = ηA · ΛH = 60% (−2.3 dB) and a ground based detector noise rate
of less than 100 cps which we ignore in comparison to the total E91 singles rate of
RA ≈ 60 Mcps. Similarly, the DSP requires a source capable of producing a con-
trollable mean photon number per pulse µDSP ≈ 0.64 (0.1) for the signal (decoy)
pulse where 50% of all pulses carry a signal[4] with a repetition rate of >1 GHz.
[4]Our key rate estimation based on the signal pulse’s µDSP is just an approximation
without taking the photon statistics of the decoy states into account, which have
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Symbol Parameter Value
dB Detector active area on CubeSat 20 µm
DA OGS telescope diameter 30 cm
DB CubeSat telescope diameter 10 cm
e0 Probability of noise count to be correct 50%
ed Probability of erroneous detection 2%
Emax
E91/DSP
Maximum tolerable QBER for E91 / DSP 10.2% / 6.2%
ηA OGS multiplexed SNSPD efficiency (E91 only) 70% (−1.5 dB)
ηB CubeSat detector efficiency 15% (−8.2 dB)
f Error correction protocol efficiency 1.1
fB Effective focal length CubeSat telescope 40 cm
fSYN Repetition rate of OGS’s beacon laser 10 MHz
FOV Field of view CubeSat (full angle) 50 µrad
λ Signal photon wavelength 810 nm
Λ Total loss −62.7 dB (max)
ΛA Total loss OGS arm (source to detector) (E91 only) 60% (−2.3 dB)
ΛH Heralding efficiency (E91 only) 85% (−0.7 dB)
ΛTA OGS telescope loss (only E91) −1.0 dB
ΛTB CubeSat telescope loss −1.5 dB
ΛOB CubeSat optical elements loss −1.0 dB
ΛPB CubeSat pointing loss −2.5 dB
ΛSB CubeSat basis switch loss −0.5 dB
ΛSYN Loss due to errors in clock sync. −0.5 dB
µDSP Mean photon number per signal pulse (DSP only) 0.64
µE91 Mean photon number per coincidence window (E91 only) 0.01
r0 Fried parameter 5 cm - 40 cm
RA OGS count rate (E91 only) 60 Mcps
RB CubeSat count rate (including noise) 3 kcps (max)
RmaxB CubeSat detectors’ maximum count rate 100 kHz
RBG CubeSat background counts (total) 80 - 180 cps
RDC CubeSat dark count rate (per detector) 200 cps
RB+D CubeSat total noise counts (per detector) 240 - 290 cps
RPDSP Effective signal photon rate (DSP only) 315 Mcps
RPE91 Pair rate of entangled photon source (E91 only) 100 Mcps
Rrep Repetition rate of single photon source (DSP only) 1 GHz
σA OGS pointing precision (rms, full angle) 2.4 µrad
σB CubeSat pointing precision (rms, full angle) 40 µrad
tA Combined OGS detectors + time tagging jitter 16 ps
tB CubeSat detector + time tagging jitter 37 ps
τ Coincidence window 80 ps
tSB CubeSat basis switching time 100 µs
tTT Time tagging resolution (on board CubeSat) 10 ps
tMD Measurement duration of each chunk for clock sync. 100 ms
tQC Maximum duration of quantum connection per pass 220 s
Table 1 List of parameters and values for which we assigned fixed values. Justification of these
values is given in Sec. 3.
This results in an actual signal photon rate RPDSP = 315 Mcps at Alice. The notion
of heralding efficiency ΛH is not applicable for DSP and can be set to 1. The same
is true for imperfections in the sender optics, since any losses prior to the free-
space link itself can be utilized to realize the desired µDSP value [31]. All sources
can be designed to produce a quantum signal at wavelength λ ≈ 810 nm, which
is a good compromise taking into account atmospheric absorption, Mie scattering
effects, diffraction, suitable lasers for producing entanglement and suitable space
based detectors (low power consumption, low dark counts and high temporal res-
a small, but non-negligible effect on the key rate. For simplicity and in order to
obtain algorithms compatible with the computing power available to us, we stick
to the partial formalism outlined in Ref. [9]. For a more detailed analysis, we refer
the reader to [29] and [30].
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Figure 2 Block diagram of the 3U CubeSat. Components in brown are those used for quantum
communication while those in green relate to the pointing, acquisition and tracking system. Other
essential subsystems are blue. The subsystems can also be classified based on the type of
components used as indicated by the grey dashed lines. All components are fixed to the CubeSat
frame, communicate with the main CPU and supply/draw power to/from the CubeSat bus (all of
which are not shown). TTM: Time Tagging Module, RNG: Random Number Generator.
olution). All sources also share a common sending telescope with an unobstructed
diameter (to ensure a better Gaussian mode and limit the ground telescope losses
ΛTA to -1.0 dB [32]) of DA = 30 cm. The tracking precision σA and slew rates of
modern telescopes (typically σA < 2.4 µrad RMS (full angle) over 5 minutes with
13◦/s slew) are an order of magnitude better than necessary to track and main-
tain an optical link with the CubeSat. For link calculations we assumed the OGS
to be located on La Palma, where both experience from previous experiments and
weather data were easily available to us. However, our design is not restricted to this
location and need only be slightly adapted for areas with e.g. more cloud coverage.
A suitable location for a second OGS still has to be fixed (see section 4.3).
3.2 The CubeSat
The CubeSat requires several subsystems as listed in Table 2. Their interrelation-
ships are shown in Fig. 2. For a 3U CubeSat, these components must fit within
0.0032 m3, weigh less than 4 kg and consume less than 21Wh per orbit (with ex-
pandable ≈ 30×30 cm2 off-the-shelf solar panels [33]). Through an iterative process
of SWaP design and analysis we have minimized the requirements of the CubeSat
while continuing to use easy-to-obtain commercial systems. We discuss the trade-
offs, design choices and compromises in Sec. 3.3. Here we focus on the quantum
payload which consists of receiving telescope, basis choice, polarization analysis and
detection subsystems (see Fig. 3). We estimate all optical losses within the Cube-
Sat (between telescope and detectors) to be ΛOB=−1.0 dB, using only standard
commercially available devices [34, 35, 36].
The most challenging aspect of designing a CubeSat is minimizing total noise
counts RB+D which therefore influences many design parameters. Unavoidable stray
light collected by the CubeSat’s receiving telescope (i.e., background counts RBG)
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Figure 3 Schematic of the optics payload on board the 3U CubeSat. The signal and beacon
beams from ground are collected by a Cassegrain-type mirror telescope. The back side of the
secondary mirror carries the earth-facing beacon laser necessary for tracking of the CubeSat. The
input Signal and beacon are separated by a dichroic mirror (DM). The latter is tracked with a fast
quadrant detector for precise attitude sensing and clock synchronization while the former passes a
binary liquid-crystal-based half-wave plate switch (LC-HWP). It randomly shifts the polarization
of incoming photons by either 0 or pi
4
. This effectively acts as a measurement basis switch in
combination with the polarizing beam splitter (PBS) separating horizontally (vertically) polarized
photons by transmitting (reflecting) them. The second PBS is used for enhanced extinction ratios.
Longpass (LP) and interference filters (IF) are used to block out stray light and the photons are
detected by silicon-based avalanche photo diodes (APD).
and the intrinsic thermal/radiation damage counts of the detectors (i.e., dark counts
per detector RDC) add up to RB+D = RBG + 2RDC and significantly degrade
the SNR. RDC , which we assume to be constant, has to be below 200 cps per
detector to achieve a reasonable SNR. Firstly, the detector noise is reduced when
operating at low temperatures. −30◦C diode temperature is desirable. Fortunately,
two 250 cm2 radiators on the sun-averted sides of the CubeSat could dissipate the
0.6 W of thermal energy required to cool both detectors. A heating resistor should
be used to further regulate the temperature to within ±1◦C. While RDC of such a
cooled detector can be less than 5 cps in laboratory conditions [37], it is increased
by damage due to energetic particles and ionizing radiation in space. This can be
mitigated by using very small active detector areas dB – the smallest commercially
available ones have a dB of 20µm, which we expect to be small enough to keep
RDC well below the 200 cps limit [38] despite a radiation damage equivalent to
a 2 year mission lifetime. Using other satellite components such as high density
batteries accounts for additional radiation shielding. Other procedures to further
lower the dark count rate, such as annealing the diodes, could also be implemented
if necessary [39]. We therefore assume a constant 200 cps of thermal and radiation
noise per detector which is, at least for the first months of operation, a conservative
estimate.
RBG are the erroneous measurement clicks due to near-infrared noise photons
originating from the ground area which are not blocked by the spectral filters.
We estimate the magnitude of this effect by using measurements of earth’s lu-
minous intensity from space [40] considering the spectral response of the Visible
Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) [41] in use. More than 50% of the Eu-
ropean Union’s land area have less than 274 µcd/m2 night sky brightness. We divide
this background intensity into contributions of artifical (light pollution mainly by
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HPS-lamp based street lights [42] which undergoes absorption through the atmo-
sphere [43]) and natural (earthshine [44]) sources. These calculations are valid for
new moon conditions. Additionally, for the most conservative estimate, we account
for scattered sunlight from a full moon (brightness: 4 000 cd/m2 [45]) reflected from
earth (mean albedo: 0.3 [46]) into to the CubeSat (we used the solar radiation spec-
trum). We then translate the luminous intensity into photons [47] per second per m2
footprint impinging on the CubeSat telescope with aperture DB = 10 cm and cal-
culate how many of these photons would pass through our 3 nm wide bandpass
filters centered at 810 nm. We arrive at values of 0.55 photons s-1m-2 in zenith and
0.17 photons s-1m-2 for the lowest elevations (because of the increased distance).
This effect of decreasing background close to the horizon is counterbalanced by the
larger footprint of the CubeSat telescope. Optical losses and detection efficiency of
the CubeSat further reduce this value (see below in this section).
In total this gives us a worst-case estimate of total noise counts which we use
for all orbits regardless of the moonphase: 2RB+D varies from ≈ 480 cps in zenith
to ≈ 575 cps at 30◦ elevation from horizon. This assumption is very conservative,
specially when compared with the 350 cps total noise counts at full moon of a similar
uplink experiment [48].
If the orbit height is fixed (we chose 500 km, see Sec. 4.3), RBG can only be reduced
by reducing the field of view (FOV= dB/fB where fB is the CubeSat telescope’s
effective focal length). This has two additional benefits: A long fB improves the
polarizing beam splitter’s (PBS) extinction ratio since it reduces the divergence of
the impinging beam within the PBS. More importantly, a small dB strongly reduces
the radiation damage to the detector due to its small cross sectional area. However,
the FOV must be large enough to maintain the OGS in view despite the pointing
errors of the CubeSat. Until recently, the attitude control of small CubeSats was too
imprecise, requiring a large FOV that would have resulted in too many background
counts to make the mission possible. The latest commercially available systems
based on star trackers [49] have a body pointing precision σB of better than 40 µrad
RMS (full angle) [50]. The resulting pointing losses ΛPB due to this error, which
are caused by an effective spot size broadening on the detectors when averaging
over time, can be shown to be
ΛPB = 1− exp
[
−
1
2 FOV
2(
2λ
piDB
)2
+ σ2B
]
. (10)
This attitude precision allows us to limit the FOV< 50 µrad while introducing
pointing losses ΛPB of −2.5 dB. These comparably high losses are outbalanced by
the strongly reducedRBG because of the narrow FOV. Optically tracking the beacon
signal holds the potential to reduce these losses.
To achieve an optimal fB , a Cassegrain-type reflector is a good choice for the re-
ceiving telescope despite the increased telescope loss ΛTB due to the secondary mir-
ror (which we estimate to be −1.5 dB in total). This is because the overall design is
lightweight and the required fB of 40 cm can be realized with a 10 cm long telescope.
The telescope covers the CubeSat’s quadratic Z+ surface of about 9 × 9 cm. For
simplicity, our calculations assume a circular telescope with DB =10 cm. Another
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significant challenge of Q.Com with a tiny CubeSat is the random basis choice at the
start of every trial. This is necessary because Eve can exploit any predictability (or
similarity between consecutive trials) of the measurement bases to gain knowledge
about the key. Mechanical rotation of a half-wave plate (HWP), while sufficient for
a proof-of-principle demonstration, is far too slow. Larger satellites can either use
a passive basis choice (i.e., a combination of a 50:50 beam splitter (BS), two PBSs,
a HWP and four detectors, such as proposed for the 12U CubeSat of Ref [51]) or
an extremely fast active one (e.g., rapid Pockels cells). The former requires longer
focal length telescopes and twice the number of detectors including their shielding,
cooling and high voltage electronics. The latter is either power hungry or waveguide-
based and extremely lossy even with small pointing errors due to the necessity of
coupling into the waveguide. Our mission design overcomes the above limitations
by using a relatively slow (response times tSB ≈100 µs [52]) liquid crystal half wave
plate (LC-HWP) [53] similar to those on board the Singaporean quantum Cube-
Sat [16]. The security of the Q.Com link can be maintained by only considering the
first detection event after each random basis choice and discarding the rest. This
leads to the additional basis switching loss factor
ΛSB =
1− e−RBtSB
RBtSB
, (11)
where RB is the combined total count rate of the CubeSat detectors (including
noise). For a very high single count rate of RB=3 kcps, ΛSB amounts to less than
−0.5 dB[5], assuming that the basis change is conditional to a detection event
which can simply be achieved electronically using a gate. If a slower LC-HWP
(e.g. tSB=3 ms) is deployed, ΛSB can go up to −8.5 dB. If one keeps all measured
bits irregardless of some being measured in the same basis setting, there are no
such losses, but measures would have be taken to improve privacy amplification,
which would inevitably also reduce the total secure key length. The LC-HWP can be
driven by a trusted random number generator, e.g. consisting of shot-noise limited
measurements of the noise on a diode [54].
After passing the LC-HWP, the photons are spatially separated by a PBS, de-
pending on their polarization. As seen in Fig. 3, the receiving telescope focuses the
beam through the polarizing optics onto the detectors. To compensate for the angle
dependent extinction ratios of the PBS and ensure ed ≤2%, another polarizer (we
suggest a second PBS rotated by 90◦ due to its high transmission) must be used in
the reflected arm of the first PBS.
To ensure that saturation and dead time effects do not cause losses >0.1 dB, we
require a maximum count rate of each CubeSat detector RmaxB  RB in the order
of 100 kHz. The detectors consist of actively quenched silicon-based avalanche photo
diodes (APDs) operated in Geiger mode, placed at the output ports of the PBS.
Since their dB of only 20 µm poses a tiny cross sectional area for harmful radiation,
only little to no radiation shielding is required, which has a positive effect on the
weight budget (see Table 2).
[5]For the sake of completeness it has to be noted that ΛSB is the only loss which
also acts on intrinsic dark counts(RDC). Since the losses are not very high and we
want to avoid underestimating noise counts, this effect is omitted.
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Errors in Q.Com depend on accidental coincidences and thus on the coincidence
detection time window τ . To correctly identify and distinguish at least 98% of all
pairs, τ > 2
√
t2A + t
2
B , where tA=16 ps is the total timing jitter on ground and tB
that on the CubeSat. Thus tB , including the jitter of the detectors [37] and the time
tagging electronics that note the arrival time of each pulse [55, 56], should be less
than 37 ps to ensure that we can choose τ=80 ps which is crucial to improving the
SNR. The detection efficiency of the detectors we chose is ηB =15%. This might
seem low, however we trade this for excellent temporal resolution. There is a trade-
off between these two parameters: Higher detection efficiency can lead to a better
secure key rate, however then the link becomes more susceptible to noise counts
because of an extended coincidence detection window (see Fig. 4).
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Figure 4 Contour plots of signal-to-noise ratio (SNRE91, left) and secure key rate (R
S
E91, right)
for an E91 scheme with a typical Fried parameter r0=20 cm and an elevation of 60◦, showing the
trade-off between CubeSat detection efficiency ηB and timing resolution τ ≈ 2
√
t2A + t
2
B where
we assue tA = 16 ps to be fixed. For our study, since we want to show principal feasibility, we
chose the PDM020 detector [37] (shown with a cross) which provides a good key rate. Other
detectors are shown for comparison.
In addition to the quantum payload, the CubeSat optics should also accommodate
an earth-facing beacon diode to aid in the ground station’s tracking of the CubeSat.
There should also be a dichroic mirror to separate the quantum signal from the OGS
beacon. The latter assists in locating and tracking the OGS and can be detected by
a fast quadrant photo diode. The OGS’s beacon signal is pulsed to facilitate clock
synchronization, and the detection pulses from the fast photo diode (along with
GPS signals) are used to discipline the local clock on board the CubeSat.
It is important to consider the pointing precision of the CubeSat. Our error es-
timates (Sec. 2) show that the FOV should be ≤50 µrad (full angle) to limit back-
ground counts. The pointing error should be of the same order of magnitude. Fur-
thermore, to keep the OGS in view, we need slew rates of at least 1◦/s. Due to
recent advances in reaction wheel and star tracker technology, commercial CubeSat
attitude control can achieve a precision of 40µrad RMS (full angle) with 10◦/s slew
rate in all three axes (for a 4 kg 3U CubeSat) [49]. In addition to the transmission
of photons, a fair amount of classical communication and processing is required
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to generate a secure key. The amount of processing done on board the CubeSat
must be minimized. Thus the CubeSat will need to transmit all detection events to
the OGS, which will compute coincidence events and share data identifying these
sparse events with the CubeSat. Therefore the amount of data transmitted by the
CubeSat far exceeds the amount of data received. We use an S-band transceiver for
the actual transmission of data. Additionally, we deploy a slower UHF transceiver
for housekeeping communications [57]. Details about the data rates can be found in
Sec. 4.5 while the processing power and time required for the CubeSat to calculate
the secure key is estimated in Sec. 4.6.
3.3 Preliminary SWaP analysis
Subsystem name Size
(U)
Weight
(g)
Peak power
(mW)
Energy per
orbit (mWh)
Optics + Detection
Telescope 1 400 - -
Shutter 100 5 000 1
Dichroic mirror + PBSs
0.75
100 - -
Phase shifter 100
Detectors + Shielding 100
see corresponding circuit below
Detector cooling (Peltier) 50
Ground tracking photo diodes 100
Measurement control
Phase shifter circuit + RNG 0.02 75 50 18
Peltier circuit 0.01 50 1 000 330
Detector circuit (AQ) 0.07 50 250 46
Photo diode circuit 0.07 100 500 375
Time tagging electronics 0.2 150 15 000 2 750
Positioning
Beacon + electronics 0.01 70 1 000 250
XACT attitude control 0.5 900 2 000 3 000
GPS + main computer 0.2 100 1 000 1 500
RF Communication
S-Band + UHF transceiver 0.25 114 6 000 9 000
Antennas 0.07 100 60 90
Energy
Batteries 0.1 200 67 000 60 000
Solar cells - 450 21 000 21 000
Radiator - 200 - -
Frame - 250 - -
Total consumption 3.25 3 759 31 860 17 360
Available 3.25 4 000 67 000 21 000
Table 2 The results of our Size, Weight and Power (SWaP) analysis along with a complete list of
subsystems and their control circuits. “Energy per orbit” refers to consumption per one full orbit while
performing a quantum measurement and takes into account different operation times for each device.
The strict limitations of SWaP consumption pose significant challenges to the
satellite design. Using commercially available products, we optimized the secure
key rate produced by the CubeSat while adhering to the standard restrictions. Our
results are shown in Table 2. All systems not described in Sec. 3.2 are based entirely
on readily available standard CubeSat components. Further customizing of certain
parts would significantly lower the total SWaP consumption. The only component
that would have to be modified is the time tagger, which is however within reach
of current technology [55].
A standard 3U CubeSat is 10x10x34.1 cm excluding the solar panels (with a maxi-
mum protrusion limit of 6.5 mm) [58]. We used a complete CAD model (a simplified
Neumann et al. Page 13 of 24
version of which is shown in Fig. 5) to study the actual assembly of components.
Please note that we did not include size margins into our calculations since the tele-
scope could be redesigned for a size-margin of 7%. Also, the optics payload would
allow for additional space e.g. for the batteries (as shown in Fig. 5). However, since
we restrict ourselves to off-the-shelf components, a 5% margin is sufficient for the
harness/electrical connections. Another way to gain more space would be to use the
less common 4U standard (10x10x45.4 cm) [59] [6].
The CubeSat standard weight limit is 4 kg for a 3U. We can include a 6% weight
margin and remain below this value. However this requirement can be relaxed to
5 kg depending on the launch provider [60], which is useful if an operational lifetime
of more than 6 months is desired. The operational lifetime is mainly limited by
radiation damage to the CubeSat, especially the APDs. Thus, heavier shielding (not
included in the current SWaP) would improve operational life times at the cost of
a tighter weight budget. The type of solar panels [33] and the orbit of the CubeSat
Figure 5 Left: Exploded view of our preliminary 3U CubeSat design. The solar panels as well as
any electric connections have been omitted for clarity. The optical elements shown in the red box
are out of scale. Right: Artistic depiction of the 3U CubeSat with expandable solar panels in
bird-wing configuration. They are mounted to the sun-facing side of the CubeSat, the other three
long sides of the surface can be covered with radiators for detector cooling.
(see Sec. 4.3) limit the total power production per orbit to 21 Wh. We consume only
87% of this value. The satellite is within line of sight of the OGS for a maximum
of 11 min (if it passes with 0◦ inclination), of which at most 220 s can be used for
key generation. Thus most subsystems only operate for a fraction of each orbit.
Together these consume 17.5 Wh[7] while the always-on systems (attitude control,
UHF-band communications, GPS and main computer) consume a further 13.5 Wh
per orbit. The CubeSat must operate only at night to avoid excessive background
counts. Thus a large set of batteries are necessary. To preserve battery life and
[6]This would imply a launch from the ISS into an approximately 400 km orbit.
[7]The time each subsystem needs to run is calculated using conservative estimates.
The detectors plus cooling are assumed to run at peak power throughout, although
they only consume so much during the initial temperature stabilization phase before
Q.Com starts. Similarly, the S-band data transmission is assumed to run for as long
as a communication link with the OGS is possible, when in reality it need only
operate for half this time.
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provide a safety margin we assumed that the batteries are never drained by more
than 30%. Thus we require a total battery capacity of at least 58 Wh. Our design
provides for 60 Wh [61]. The CubeSat consumes a total of 31.9 Wh per orbit but
its solar panels can only produce 21 Wh. This means that the CubeSat is capable
of a Q.Com link roughly once every 1.5 orbits. Larger satellites would be needed
for continuous operation of the Q.Com link with more than one OGS, however this
drastically increases the cost. We estimate our CubeSat operating in a constellation
to optimize the cost per secure key bit given the current market demand for Q.Com.
4 Performance analysis
Having specified the key parameters for the design of our CubeSat, we now want
to give an estimate on the amount of secret key the satellite could acquire with two
sufficiently separated OGS (one located on La Palma, the other one e.g. in Australia)
over one year (Section 4.7). To this end, we derive a model for geometric losses due
to beam divergence (Section 4.1) while incorporating long-time measurements of
atmospheric turbulence and weather influences (Section 4.2) to calculate different
loss scenarios for our uplink. We also carry out an orbit assessment (Section 4.3).
Lastly, we evaluate the requirements for an on board clock (Section 4.4) and estimate
the data storage and -transmission needs (Section 4.5), as well as the computational
requirements of the CubeSat (Section 4.6).
4.1 Optical loss model
The total loss Λ consists of several contributions:
Λ = ΛA · ΛB = ηA · Λ2H · ΛTA · ΛL · ΛPB · ΛTB · ΛOB · ΛSB · ΛSYN · ηB , (12)
where ηA · Λ2H · ΛTA = 1 for DSP and ΛL is the link transmission from sender to
receiver lens which we want to assess in this section. For a detailed justification
of the values in use (which are listed in Table 1), see Sec. 3 of this manuscript.
Assuming Gaussian optics, the link loss ΛL can be estimated as
ΛL(ϕ) =
[
1− exp
[
− 1
2
(
DB
wLP (ϕ)
)2]]
· ΛATM (ϕ) , (13)
where wLP (ϕ) is the effective beam waist of the uplink signal at the satellite, de-
pending on the zenith angle ϕ:
wLP (ϕ) =
√
w2L(ϕ) +
(
σA · L(ϕ)
)2
. (14)
Here, we assumed that the OGS’s pointing error σA follows a normal distribution,
effectively increasing the divergence of the up-going beam. This is equivalent to the
effect of an OGS pointing loss ΛPA. L(ϕ) is the distance OGS-satellite. wL(ϕ) is
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the beam waist at the CubeSat prior to pointing errors:[8]
wL(ϕ) = L(ϕ)
λ
0.316DApi
[
1 + 0.83 · sec(ϕ)
(
DA
r0
)5/3]3/5
, (15)
where λ=810 nm is the photon wavelength (see Sec. 3.1) and r0 is the Fried pa-
rameter in zenith. The atmospheric attenuation ΛATM (ϕ) in Eq. 13 is given by
ΛATM = exp[−β · sec(ϕ)] , (16)
where β = 0.22 is the extinction optical thickness at sea level for 800 nm [62].
4.2 Weather considerations
Weather conditions are crucial especially for optical uplinks since atmospheric dis-
turbance happens immediately after the sending aperture. The Fried parameter r0
gives an estimate of the atmosphere’s coherence length and directly influences the
upgoing beam’s divergence, similar to an optical aperture. Measurements of the Ro-
boDIMM on La Palma [63] over 9 years allow us to estimate the atmospheric link
quality for an OGS stationed there (see Fig. 6). Optical loss estimates for different
Fried parameters can be found in Sec. 4.7, assuming a 500 km orbit and 0◦ incli-
nation with regard to the OGS. Deployment of adaptive optics systems on ground
correcting for atmospheric turbulence could further decrease ΛL.
4.3 Orbit considerations
A preliminary assessment of possible orbits has to consider several limitations.
To minimize space debris, a CubeSat cannot exceed an orbit around 650-700 km
which limits the lifetime in orbit to less than 25 years [64]. On the other hand,
the mission shall have an operational lifetime of at least one year. This results in
a minimum orbit altitude of around 400 km (which is approximately the height of
the the ISS orbit). Subsequently, within the range between 400 and 700 km, the
choice of orbit altitude is driven by the desire to maximize the link time, relax
requirements to the attitude control system as well as alignment considerations
and the power budget. Considering the need to conduct the experiments during
eclipse times and the fact that a significant amount of (classical) data needs to be
sent between OGS and CubeSat, also orbit inclination and right ascension of the
ascending node (RAAN) need to be considered. Variation of any of those orbital
parameters has significant impact on the amount and duration of passes per day.
We arrived at a preliminary orbit height of 500 km (LEO). The type of orbit has
an equally significant impact. An initial assessment was done to compare the link
[8]The divisor 0.316 results from the fact that any aperture passed by a real beam
results in an Airy disk pattern. We consider only the innermost disk since all others’
divergence is too great to hit the satellite. Now 0.316DA is the beam waist which a
ideal Gaussian beam of the same intensity distribution as the innermost airy disk
would have at the sending aperture, which allows us in good approximation to stick
to Gaussian optics instead of having to apply Bessel functions.
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Figure 6 Histogram of days per year with certain Fried parameters r0, averaged over nine years
starting in February 2008. Insufficient weather conditions as well as technical problems lead to
N=228 instead of 365. The average daily r0 is 19.7 cm.
budget between a 97.3◦ inclined sun-synchronous (SSO) and a circular orbit (CO)
with 30◦ inclination. For the calculations shown in Fig. 8, a ground station on La
Palma was assumed. Also note that we only considered orbital passes which allow
for an actual quantum link, i.e. with elevation of > 30◦ from horizon and where the
OGS is in eclipse. For transmission of classical data via the S-band link, all visible
orbits can be used, which amount to another ≈ 40 000 s (≈ 200 000 s) for SSO (CO).
The results shown in Fig. 8 are for a mission time of one year (June 2020 to June
2021). While the total link time of the SSO is only 37 115 s, the 30◦ CO offers a
significantly higher total link time of 71 435 s. Fig. 7 shows the main reason for this
difference. The number of passes for a CO is significantly higher than for a SSO
during one year (366 vs. 227). Also, the CO passes have a higher average link time
(195 s vs. 163 s). The inclination of a CO and its altitude have a large impact on
the link time. Fig. 7 shows the variation of link time with the orbit inclination. The
best results in terms of total link time are achieved with an inclination close to the
latitude of the ground station, in our case assumed to be on La Palma.
The trapped proton flux in LEO is a significant source of radiation that can
cause damage to the detectors. This radiation is significantly lower for a CO than
a SSO [65].
For Q.Com between two locations on the ground, using the CubeSat as a trusted
node, a second OGS would be necessary. It should be situated along the path of
the CubeSat. Currently, daytime Q.Com is not possible with our scheme. However,
an OGS in e.g. Australia would be able to communicate with the CubeSat during
daytime in La Palma (assuming the choice of a 30◦ CO).
4.4 Clock synchronization
Both the OGS (Alice) and the CubeSat (Bob) measure the arrival time of photons
according to their own local clocks (oscillators). Nevertheless, to identify photon
pairs, we must synchronize these two clocks. The precision of this clock synchro-
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We assume that the OGS is located at 28◦ 45’ 25” N, 17◦ 53’ 33” W. Only passes with more than
30◦ maximum elevation are considered to be contributing to the total link time.
nization along with the timing jitter of the detectors and electronics determines the
coincidence window. Improper synchronization leads to otherwise avoidable losses.
Synchronization can be achieved using various methods such as coarse synchro-
nization to 10 ns using GPS [66], exploiting the intrinsic time correlation of en-
tangled photon pairs [67], or using a pulsed beacon laser [2]. Clearly, GPS is too
imprecise. To exploit the time correlations of photon pairs, we must measure a cross-
correlation peak in the arrival times between the OGS and CubeSat. The smallest
measurement duration where we can unambiguously identify almost every coinci-
dence peak (with the maximum acceptable total loss calculated above) is 100 ms [9].
In LEO, the velocity of the CubeSat is so large that the optical path length between
the OGS and satellite can change by as much as ≈6 km/s. Naturally, this causes
the coincidence peak to broaden significantly. Orbital predictions and measurements
can be used to correct for this. However, their typical precision is about 10 cm [68].
This still adds a few hundred picoseconds to the coincidence window needed.
Thus we use a pulsed beacon laser on the OGS and fast photo diodes in the
CubeSat to implement a phase-locked loop and make sure that the CubeSat clock
oscillates at the same frequency as that of the OGS. A beacon pulsed at a repetition
rate of fSYN = 10 MHz coupled with a fast photo diode receiver (with, say, 1 GHz)
[9]Our minimum expected pair rate is about 52 pairs/s. To be able to correctly
identify a peak, we must have more coincidence events than accidentals. With 5
coincidences we can correctly identify the peak >95% of the time. Hence we choose
100 ms as the minimum chunk duration for estimating requirements.
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bandwidth on the satellite can be used to synchronize the two oscillators to within
10 ps. Additionally, turbulence in the atmosphere can account for up to 3 mm (i.e.,
≈ 10 ps) of jitter in the beacon laser’s arrival time [69]. The effects of such phase
jitter on the received signal can be mitigated to a large extent using a technique
called jitter attenuation [70]. Nevertheless let us conservatively consider a total
clock synchronization jitter of 20 ps. Using our chosen coincidence window of 80 ps,
the above results in a synchronization loss ΛSYN < 0.5 dB. Alternatively, we could
avoid this additional loss by increasing the coincidence window to accommodate
the uncertainty in the clock synchronization (i.e. the coincidence window would be
100 ps instead of the chosen 80 ps.).
4.5 Data Storage and transmission
Since the computing power on the CubeSat is limited, Bob should send the list of
all his time tags and basis choices (not measurement outcomes) down to the OGS
and let Alice identify the coincidences and matching bases to tell him which counts
to use. To estimate the size of data packages, we assume a time tag resolution tTT
of 10ps [55]. To keep the data size per tag low, it is beneficial to store just the
time elapsed between consecutive events on the CubeSat. The probability ηsep that
the temporal separation between two successive photons will not exceed a time
span tmax during a a maximum quantum connection of duration tQC = 220 s (see
Sec. 4.3) is given by
ηsep =
(
1− (1 +RBtmax) · e−RBtmax
) tQC
tmax
, (17)
If one aims for a probability of less than 0.1% for an overflow to occur during one
220 s connection (i.e., ηsep >99.9%), assuming a minimum RB of 1 kcps because of
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noise counts in both detectors, tmax ≈20 ms (result obtained numerically). This is
equivalent to log2(
tmax
tTT
) = 33 bits per time tag including information about mea-
surement basis and outcome. Therefore in one visible pass under optimal conditions
(i.e., a 0◦ inclination overpass with an r0 of 40 cm), a maximum of 17 Mbit of data is
acquired. This means that with an 250 kbps S-band transceiver on board the satel-
lite, the data can be sent down in labout 70 s [10]. This is possible still during the
Q.Com orbit if the classical transfer can be started right after the quantum link is
established. Otherwise, another ground station in the satellite’s path could be used
or simply the next visible orbit. After Alice has calculated the correlation function
and compatible basis choices, she needs to tell Bob which bits to use. Re-sending
the time tags of the correct outcomes amounts to a total 3.2 Mbit and requires
another orbit since Alice has to calculate the g(2) in advance. In this second orbit,
error correction and privacy amplification can also be carried out.
4.6 On board computing requirements
The classical post processing required to obtain a secure key is not trivial and dic-
tates the choice of the on board processing capabilities of the CubeSat. A detailed
overview of these requirements can be found in Ref. [71]. We also base our esti-
mates provided below on the equations provided there. The first step is to identify
coincidence events. This is commonly done by computing a timing cross-correlation
histogram which can be a computationally intensive task[11]. We recommend that
the CubeSat share the timing of all its detection events with the OGS. The OGS
can identify coincidence events and notify the CubeSat. This minimizes the amount
of data transferred and the amount of calculations the CubeSat needs to perform.
The on board processing of all the ntag time tags should be less than 18ntag op-
erations in the worst case. Calculating a sifted a key of length mkey is estimated
to require roughly mkey bits of memory and 15mkey operations to complete. Er-
ror correction requires additional memory and computational power. About 10 to
20 MB of memory is sufficient for this when using algorithms based on low density
parity check codes. Privacy amplification can be very memory efficient when us-
ing a linear-feedback shift-register-based matrix implementation and only requires
memory equal to the sifted key length (i.e., mkey bits). To estimate the processing
power required, we must keep in mind that a lower SNR increases the amount of
error correction and privacy amplification necessary. In the worst case we estimate
that all these PP steps will require ≈ 258 million operations per second to cal-
culate the secure key in real time. This can easily be handled by a commercially
available space certified on-board computer (OBC) with an ARM9 processor run-
ning at 400MHz with enough spare processing power for other satellite tasks [72].
Considering possible delays and interruptions in the classical communication link,
we estimate that PP would require approximately 300 MB of temporary memory.
[10]These data transfer calculations assume an error free S-band link. Additional
time or bandwidth will be needed to avoid garbled data.
[11]The computational complexity of this task depends on the range of time delays
that need to be scanned. Poor clock synchronization, low count rates and ever
changing delays due to the satellite’s motion increase the range of delays over which
the cross correlation function must be computed.
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The OBC we consider can provide as much as 4 GB SD card storage space. We note
that the on board operating system, control programs, housekeeping functions etc.
will require additional processing power and memory.
4.7 Expected secure key rates
Now that we have shown that Q.Com with a 3U CubeSat is feasible in principle,
we will give an estimate of the expected key rates. Measurements by the RoboDIMM
seeing monitor on La Palma show that an r0 of larger than 5 cm can be achieved for
more than 227 nights per year (see Fig. 6) or 62% of the time. Therefore, assuming
a circular orbit with 30◦ orbital inclination (see Sec. 4.3), it can be assumed that
for a total of 44 300 s or 12:20 h, each year the link quality is sufficient to perform
Q.Com. The average inclination in zenith as seen from the OGS, ϕ, is 28.3◦ (unlike
the orbital pass shown in Fig. 4.7 where ϕ goes down to 0◦). Computing for such an
average orbit and taking the r0 measurements of Sec. 4.2 into account, the total key
acquired in one year would therefore amount to 4.0 Mbit (13.0 Mbit) for E91 (DSP).
5 Conclusion
Q.Com offers the highest security possible. However, it is expensive and commu-
nication distances are limited. Our complete feasibility study has shown that it is
possible to achieve Q.Com over thousands of kilometers using a relatively cheap
and easy to construct CubeSat. By miniaturizing the design, optimizing power con-
sumption and minimizing the weight we have shown that full-fledged commercial
global Q.Com can be achieved with a simple 3U CubeSat. Not only have we shown
that Q.Com is possible with such a small satellite, but we have also improved upon
state-of-the-art mission designs. We have provided guidelines for building a Q.Com
mission which includes selection guides for the components, trade-offs and opti-
mizations for the secure key rate, choice of orbits etc. We discussed methods to
overcome key challenges using currently available technology. We showed that the
fine pointing capabilities of CubeSats no longer limit their applicability for Q.Com
and optical links.
Using our CubeSat design, a pair of ground stations can exchange 13·106 abso-
lutely secure bits/year. Our CubeSat design (considering only hardware and launch)
would cost < 0.5 millione (naturally, the research/development and manpower
costs for the first such satellite would be higher) [60]. Assuming a lifetime of two
years, information theoretic security could be bought for as little as ≈60e/kbit[12].
Key expansion protocols can be used to grow the key with only marginal security
implications. Also the deployment of detectors with other characteristics can help
[12]There are several ways to improve the cost per kbit. First, better radiation re-
sistance and shielding would increase the lifetime of the CubeSat and proportion-
ally decrease costs. Second, the current cost estimate is for the interaction of one
CubeSat with a pair of OGSs on opposite sides of the globe. However with careful
selection, one can use multiple OGSs with the same satellite during a single orbit
provided we can increase the battery capacity of the CubeSat. This would dras-
tically reduce the costs. Third, a mass produced constellation of satellites could
reduce the the cost by a further order of magnitude.
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improve the key rate at cost of the SNR (see Fig. 4). A commercially viable Q.Com
satellite needs significant classical computation power, data storage and classical
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communication bandwidth. We have evaluated all these requirements and outlined
strategies to achieve all this with minimal resources. Our future-proof planning
allows for maximum versatility while utilizing minimal components on board the
CubeSat. This also reduces the overall risk of the mission. Our CubeSat is compat-
ible with the widest possible variety of polarization based Q.Com protocols. It can
implement the decoy state protocol to minimize client resources or entanglement-
based protocols for best verifiable security. We have provided a complete CAD
model of the CubeSat as well as a detailed discussion of the trade-offs involved in
selecting components (such as those between: detection efficiency and timing jitter,
radiation damage and FOV, erroneous counts and detector size, E91 and DSP, orbit
of the satellite and total key etc.). In the current design, the CubeSat is a trusted
node. This is ideal for useage scenarios like communication between many branches
of a single organization. The proposed CubeSat can also be used for fundamental
experiments such as Bell tests which require a SNR of only 4.8 (as opposed to the
SNR of 8.8 / 15.1 needed by QKD), clock synchronization, light pollution measure-
ments and earth/atmosphere observation at the beacon wavelengths. The CubeSat
can also be used to study the effect of gravity on quantum systems [73].
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